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An evolving literature on the Water-Energy-Food (WEF) nexus argues that there is a
need to better understand the conditions under which nexus coordination may occur.
A case in point are hydropower investments on shared rivers which might impact the
provision of energy, water and food security across borders. In international basins,
governing the WEF nexus impacts of hydropower relies on voluntary negotiations
between the respective countries involved. It has been argued that such negotiationsmay
be facilitated by regional organizations, such as international river basin organizations
(IRBOs), but this claim has hardly been investigated systematically. Drawing on regime
theory in international relations and the literature on benefit sharing, this paper asks
what role regional organizations may play in governing hydropower-related WEF nexus
impacts. It compares three cases of hydropower planning on shared rivers. The Rusumo
Falls and the Ruzizi III hydropower projects (HPPs) are joint investments in Africa’s Great
Lakes region facilitated by an IRBO and a regional energy organization, respectively. On
the Mekong, Laos is constructing the Xayaburi dam despite reservations by the Mekong
River Commission and downstream riparians. The paper finds IRBOs and regional energy
organizations may play a role in facilitating cross-border nexus governance by supporting
benefit-sharing arrangements and by fostering the application of environmental and
social safeguards and international law principles. However, it also shows that the
influence of regional organizations varies, and how successfully they support nexus
governance also depends on whether the HPP is planned unilaterally or jointly; the
availability and consensus on data on nexus impacts; and the presence or absence of
donors and private sector capital and investors.
Keywords: water-energy-food nexus, governance, hydropower, transboundary river, river basin organization,
Rusumo Falls, Ruzizi III, Xayaburi
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INTRODUCTION
In international river basins, hydropower projects (HPPs)
generate multiple cross-border, cross-sector interdependencies
related to water, energy and food security. Many African and
Asian countries have been investing strongly in hydropower to
supply their rapidly growing economies (IHA, 2017). Many of
these investments take place along international rivers. While
the main purpose of hydropower is to contribute to energy
security, dams often negatively affect water and food security and
ecosystems services by blocking fish migration routes, destroying
fertile agricultural lands and leading to the eviction of project-
affected communities. Hence, investments in HPPs may raise
several issues in relation to the water–energy–food (WEF) nexus
by one-sidedly focusing on energy production, but neglecting the
impact on water and food security.
The WEF nexus debate acknowledges the increasing
interconnectedness of water, energy and land resources
[sometimes referred to as the WEL nexus, e.g., ODI et al.
(2012)] in providing water, energy and food security [WEF
nexus, e.g., Hoff (2011), WEF-WI (2011)] for a rising world
population under conditions of economic growth and climate
change. For instance, Müller et al. (2015) point out how four
output dimensions, namely the provision of water, energy and
food security and a world of less than two degrees warming
increase pressures on inputs such as soil, water and biodiversity
and the ecosystem services they provide. Hence, pursuing one
security may go along with synergies and trade-offs related to the
other securities. Nexus thinking therefore argues for mobilizing
synergies and managing critical trade-offs (Hoff, 2011; WEF-WI,
2011; ICSU, 2017). Still, the term WEF nexus has no globally
agreed definition. Lebel and Lebel (2018) identify politicized
and de-politicized notions of the term. Some of these notions
carry positive connotations, while others are negative, depending
on the actors involved and their attitudes toward a particular
development project [for other conceptualizations of nexus see
Keskinen et al. (2016)].
Despite a wide-rangingWEF literature investigating synergies
and trade-offs in the provision of water, energy and food
securities, Weitz et al. (2017) point out that our understanding
of what governing the WEF nexus means and under which
conditions it works or not remains very limited and more
empirical work on the matter is warranted (see also Villamayor-
Tomas et al., 2015). This paper therefore seeks to contribute to
the evolving literature on governing theWEF nexus by providing
a more in-depth analysis of the case of hydropower investments
on shared rivers and the role that regional organizationsmay have
in governing nexus impacts.
Some authors argue that in a transboundary context, regional
basin organizationsmay be particularly well-positioned to govern
nexus impacts due to their access to key actors in relevant sectors
and across geographical scales (e.g., UNEP, 2014; Scheumann
and Tigrek, 2015). We investigate these arguments by drawing
on the literature on regime theory and the literature on
benefit sharing in order to investigate the role of regional
organizations in the transboundary governance of the water–
energy–food nexus (hereinafter “nexus governance”) related to
hydropower investments along international rivers. Empirically,
we focus on three recent investments into hydropower on
shared rivers: the Ruzizi III, Rusumo Falls, and Xayaburi dam
projects. Drawing upon Paavola (2007) and Müller et al. (2015),
the paper understands nexus governance as a dynamic and
recursive process involving state and non-state actors who
establish, reaffirm or change institutions to resolve conflicts and
negotiate political decisions in a way that takes into account
interdependencies between soil, water and biodiversity systems
in the provision of water, energy and food security.
The section on WEF Nexus, HPPs and the Potential Role
of Regional Organizations further conceptualizes the WEF
nexus related to hydropower investments on shared rivers and
the potential role of regional organizations in governing this
nexus situation. The paper then introduces the cases studies
and the methodologies used. The section on Results presents
key findings, following by a discussion of these findings.
The Conclusion presents the wider implications for nexus
governance.
WEF NEXUS, HPPs AND THE POTENTIAL
ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
In order to conceptualize the potential role of regional
organizations in governing theWEF nexus related to hydropower
investments on shared rivers, this section draws upon and brings
together three strands of literatures, namely (1) on governing
the WEF nexus, (2) on regime theory/neo-institutionalism in
international relations, and (3) on benefit-sharing related to
HPPs on shared rivers. The section onGoverning theWEFNexus
Related to Hydropower on Shared Rivers discusses implications
of the emerging literature on governing the WEF nexus for the
case of hydropower on shared rivers. Drawing on regime theory
and literature on benefit sharing, section Potential Benefits From
Coordination and Nexus Governance Related to HPP on Shared
Rivers asks for potential benefits from—or incentives for—
coordinating WEF-nexus implications of hydropower projects
across countries. Further elaborating on regime theory/neo-
institutionalism, section Regional Organizations as Coordinating
Agencies? then focuses on the role of regional organizations
in fostering the governance of WEF-nexus implications of
hydropower projects on shared rivers.
Governing the WEF Nexus Related to
Hydropower on Shared Rivers
The WEF nexus literature often bemoans a lack of coordination
between relevant policy sectors and argues that there is a need to
“overcome” siloed decision-making and to work across sectoral
boundaries (Hoff, 2011; Leck et al., 2015; Rasul and Sharma,
2016). Many authors stress the need for cross-sector coordination
and adequate multi-level governance, taking the geographical
scale of the respective nexus problem into account (Leck
et al., 2015; Müller et al., 2015; Weitz et al., 2017; Pahl-Wostl,
in press). Others argue for flexible, adaptive and polycentric
governance mechanisms for nexus governance (Gallagher et al.,
2016). Hence, managing the WEF nexus is not only a matter
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of understanding interconnections (e.g., through modeling) of
technology and infrastructure, but also a matter of governance
(Bazilian et al., 2011; Kurian, 2017).
However, as Stein et al. (2014) argue, governance can as much
be part of the solution, as it can be part of the problem.Weitz et al.
(2017) thus argue that there is a need to better understand the
conditions under which coordination related to the WEF nexus
might come about, including the benefits that self-interested
actors might derive from coordination as well as the emergence
and role of coordinating agencies, but also the challenges that
are likely to hinder coordination across WEF sectors and levels
of governance. Based on their comprehensive evaluation of the
literature on Integrative Environmental Governance they put
forward that coordination may be supported by communicative
(e.g., Sustainable Development strategies), organizational (e.g.,
working groups, coordinating agencies), and procedural (e.g.,
Strategic Environmental Assessments, SEA) instruments, smart
policy mixes as well as the presence of meta-governance
principles (e.g., transparency, accountability) and information.
However, they also note that (1) negotiations usually take place
among actors with unequal power, (2) cross-sector coordination
may be inhibited by the transaction costs of involving all
affected actors, and (3) solutions may simply lie outside the
concerned nexus sectors. Recent case studies on governing the
WEF nexus in developing countries also hint at these obstacles,
but highlight low state capacities as well as lack of data related to
natural resource use as additional barriers (Never and Stepping,
forthcoming; Rodriguez-de-Francisco et al., in preparation).
When hydropower investments are made along international
rivers, it is not only necessary to ensure coordination between
the energy, water, environment and, possibly, agricultural sectors
within the investing country, but often also with respective
sectoral institutions in riparian countries and possibly with
further non-state actors, if conflicts among states are to be
prevented. In the international system, such cross-border, cross-
sector coordination relies on voluntary negotiations of the actors
involved. However, it has been argued that such negotiations
may be supported by interstate organizations at regional level
(hereinafter “regional organizations”), such as international river
basin organizations (IRBOs). For instance UNECE (2015: 5)
argues that given that IRBOs “. . . have experience in bringing
together different stakeholder[s] across a basin, they lend
themselves naturally to the implementation of nexus-based
management approaches in shared basins.” Similarly, a draft
UNEP report points out that IRBOs can be catalysts to help
govern the WEF nexus as they usually work with the agricultural
sector on irrigation, the energy sector on hydropower or the
environment sector on wetlands (UNEP, 2014). However, the
report also warns that the institutional set-up, mandate and
capacity of IRBOs may vary considerably across basins, which
may influence the ability of IRBOs for nexus governance.
Furthermore, Scheumann and Tigrek (2015) put forward that
in transboundary settings it may sometimes be easier for energy
rather than for water sector institutions to resolve issues around
hydropower. Hence, regional economic communities, regional
energy organizations or possibly regional power pools may also
play a role in nexus governance.
In the following, we argue that nexus governance related to
hydropower on shared rivers takes place, if riparian countries
coordinate in the design of HPPs so that interdependencies
between energy, water and food security are taken into
account. We assume that coordination can be expected, if it
is in the (perceived) self-interest of the respective investing
countries (section Potential Benefits From Coordination and
Nexus Governance Related to HPP on Shared Rivers). We
furthermore explore in what ways regional organizations might
influence whether such coordination occurs (section Regional
Organizations as Coordinating Agencies?).
Potential Benefits From Coordination and
Nexus Governance Related to HPP on
Shared Rivers
Regime theory in international relations theory argues that
in the international system coordination and cooperation can
be expected when it is in the interest of the actors involved
and, in particular, when the actors involved may realize
benefits from cooperation (e.g., Keohane, 1984). However,
often, even where potential benefits of cooperation exist,
cooperation may be inhibited by collective action dilemmas in
which individual rationality leads to collectively sub-optimal
outcomes (Stein, 1982). In this case, regime theory assumes
that institutions—or international regimes—may play a critical
role in promoting cooperation. International regimes can be
understood as “implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations
converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner,
1983). Complementary to regime theory, the literature on
benefit sharing explores in greater depth opportunities for the
generation of benefits of cooperation on shared rivers as well
as institutional prerequisites for their realization (Sadoff and
Grey, 2002; Klaphake, 2006; Dombrowsky, 2009; Scheumann
et al., 2014). We use this literature to explore potential benefits
from cooperation and hence a country’s potential self-interest in
coordination and nexus governance related to HPPs on shared
rivers.
While the main purpose of HPPs is to contribute to energy
security, they may negatively affect water resources, ecosystems
and livelihoods, including water and food security, at the
reservoir site or downstream of it. However, HPPs may also
themselves be negatively impacted by upstream land and water
use.
Inmany cases, hydropower projects on international rivers are
pursued unilaterally by one riparian state. However, the literature
on benefit sharing has established that it can be in the self-interest
of states to engage in multilateral coordination and cooperation
in order to avoid negative impacts or to generate positive-
sum outcomes. If self-interest is understood in a narrow sense,
e.g., ignoring reputational effects, an investing state may not
be concerned about negative impacts on downstream countries.
However, the situation may change if the investing state is
interested in maintaining general good relations with its co-
riparian states or if an international water treaty commits
signatories to avoid significant harm (LeMarquand, 1977).
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Hence, whether negative impacts of HPPs on downstream
countries and related nexus effects are taken into account
also depends on how self-interest is defined. The situation
is more obvious, if the HPP itself is negatively impacted by
upstream countries’ land and water uses. For instance, it could
be conceivable that hydropower investors offer Payments for
Ecosystem Services (PES) to land and water users upstream in
order to reduce negative impacts on the operation of the plant
(Rodriguez-de-Francisco et al., in preparation).
The literature on benefit sharing has argued that under certain
conditions benefits from joint dam construction offer incentives
to pursue HPPs as joint rather than unilateral investments.
Such incentives to cooperate exist if: (i) cooperation will enable
states to overcome economic or financial limitations to unilateral
action (e.g., in the case of the Manantali dam on the Senegal
River); (ii) altering the design of a dam upstream will increase
aggregate net benefits (e.g., dams on the Columbia River); (iii)
locating a dam upstream will increase aggregate net benefits (e.g.,
Lesotho-Highlands Project on the Orange-Senqu River); or (iv)
if a joint dam on a border river will produce mutual benefits
(e.g., Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River) (Hensengerth et al.,
2012; Scheumann et al., 2014). In the case of joint investments,
it is often easier than in the case of unilateral investments to
take multiple benefit and cost streams for the various actors
involved into account and to compensate those who lose. In fact,
taking the various cost and benefit streams into account may
even be necessary in order to come to an agreement. Hence,
it can be assumed that joint investments are conducive toward
nexus governance. However, the literature also indicates that in
past projects, the effects of these joint dams on the provision of
ecosystem services were not necessarily considered (Hensengerth
et al., 2012). Indeed, coordination over dam projects in the
above cases has occurred in the interest of maximizing electricity
output, rather than in the interest of generating positive trade-
offs for water and food security. Hence, while nexus governance
may be easier and more likely in the case of joint rather than
unilateral investments, even joint investments do not provide
a guarantee for adequate nexus governance. This raises the
question to what extent nexus governance related to HPPs on
shared rivers may be further fostered by regional organizations
as potential coordinating agencies.
Regional Organizations as Coordinating
Agencies?
When international regimes are institutionalized in a way that
they take on actor quality, understood as the ability to act
independently, we may speak of international organizations
(Schmeier et al., 2016 with reference to Keohane, 1988). More
specifically, IRBOs have been defined as “institutionalized
forms of cooperation that are based on binding international
agreements covering the geographically defined area of
international river or lake basins characterized by principles,
norms, rules and governance mechanisms” (Schmeier et al.,
2016). Out of 124 potential cases, Schmeier et al. (2016)
identified a total 81 IRBOs worldwide that satisfied their
definition.
As argued by neo-institutionalism, a key function of
international organizations is to support member states’
interaction (Abbott and Snidal, 1998), and as such reduce
transaction costs. Overall, the literature on international and
regional organizations identifies various functions that these
organizations may fulfill. It has been argued that they provide
a stable negotiation forum, which may be used for (1) building
trust, (2) establishing rules of engagement (e.g., supporting
principles of international law and social and environmental
safeguards), (3) analyzing cooperative strategies, (4) pooling
or attracting financial resources, (5) sharing the benefits
and costs of cooperation, (6) monitoring the implementation
of agreements—and hence enforcement—and (7) managing
conflicts (e.g., Schiff and Winters, 2002; Hensel et al., 2006; Linn
and Pidufala, 2008; Gerlak and Schmeier, 2016).
In terms of nexus governance, in the following we argue that
there may be three main avenues by which regional organization
may encourage member states to take the cross-border, cross-
sector effects of hydropower investments into account: first, by
supporting benefit-sharing arrangements, second by ensuring
the application of safeguards, and third by fostering the
application of principles of international water law. First, regional
organizations may support the negotiation of benefit-sharing
arrangements by two or more riparian states. This will mostly
relate to cases in which co-riparians opt for joint investments,
but could theoretically also apply to unilateral investments [e.g.,
such as currently discussed for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam (Tawfik and Dombrowsky, 2018)]. In this context, regional
organizations may also support the self-interested coordination
with upstream water and land users [as occurred during the
negotiations for the Columbia River Treaty (LeMarquand,
1993)].
Second, regional organizations may support the application
of international social and environmental safeguards (Abbott
and Snidal, 1998). This will be easier if investments are planned
jointly, but may even apply to unilateral investments. This could
include a comprehensive options assessment before a decision on
a particular energy generation option is taken, as recommended
by the World Commission on Dams (WCD, 2000). A Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA) “helps define key aspects
related to the effects of the energy installations; evaluates
a wide range of likely environmental and health impacts;
compares alternatives and pros and cons; determines adaptation
and mitigation measures and actions; and helps move toward
increased efficiency of resources” (UNECE, 2015). Possibly, the
regional organization could also carry out a “transboundary
nexus assessment,” as developed by UNECE (UNECE, 2015;
Strasser et al., 2016). Furthermore, a regional organization may
develop its own guidelines for sustainable hydropower, as did the
International Commission for the Protection of theDanube River
(ICPDR, 2013) and theMekong River Commission (MRC, 2009).
Once a decision on a hydropower investment is taken regional
organizations may coordinate the preparation of transboundary
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) (UNECE,
1991; Bastmeijer and Koivurova, 2008) and Resettlement
Action Plans in order to minimize and mitigate negative
impacts.
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Third, IRBOs, in particular, may support the application of
principles of international water law. IRBOs are usually based
on basic customary principles of international water law, such as
“equitable and reasonable utilization,” “avoidance of significant
harm,” and “prior notification” (McCaffrey, 2003; Schmeier,
2013). While “significant harm” is to be avoided, according to
the 1997UNWatercourse Convention, the less severe “significant
adverse effects” are to be dealt with through procedures of prior
notification (see Articles 13–19). So far, 36 states have ratified
the convention, and are bound by these principles (Gupta, 2016).
Even if riparian countries have not ratified the Convention, we
may expect that many IRBOs encourage notification processes
as a customary principle of international water law (McCaffrey,
2003). However, in many cases such as the Mekong, the issue
has been as to what international water law principles such as
“significant harm” mean, and different basin states have applied
different views, leading to differences in perception that are hard
to unite (Conca et al., 2006).
Empirical research on IRBOs shows that the design, the
functions and the effectiveness of IRBOs vary significantly.
IRBOs differ greatly in terms of their membership, mandate
and functional scope, organizational and financing structure
and capacities (Dombrowsky, 2007; Schmeier, 2013; Gerlak
and Schmeier, 2016). Next to contextual factors, IRBO design
has been identified as an important determinant of IRBO
effectiveness (Schmeier, 2013; Gerlak and Schmeier, 2016), and
it is also likely to influence nexus governance. For instance,
it can be assumed that it is more likely that transboundary
effects are considered if all affected countries are members of
the regional organization. Furthermore, it may be easier to
involve various sectors if the organization has a sufficiently
broad mandate and functional scope to do so. Where in
place, secretariats may provide information and hence reduce
uncertainty, increase transparency and lower transaction costs
(Linn and Pidufala, 2008; Saruchera and Lautze, 2016), and may
even serve as agenda setters by exploring technically feasible
and mutually acceptable solutions (Bauer, 2006; Dombrowsky,
2007; Jinnah, 2014). Hence, in the case studies we will further
explore what role the respective regional organizations played
in terms of supporting benefit-sharing arrangements, ensuring
the application of safeguards, and fostering the application of
principles of international water law, and how these potential
roles were influenced by their institutional designs (membership,
functional scope und secretariat).
THE CASES AND METHODOLOGY
Our research is based on a case study approach, as the total
universe of possible cases to be studied for our object of analysis is
rather limited, and as it is not straightforward to establish causal
relationships in the respective complex settings. Still, case studies
are one approach to test whether certain theoretical assumptions
are applicable in the real world (Yin, 1994). According to Gerring
(2007), the case study approach is defined as an intensive study
of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases). It
allows some degree of inference about a larger class of similar
units, although the unit under consideration is not representative
and homogeneity across the sample is not possible. It also
enables theoretical development based on empirical insights
obtained from the field work conducted. We have selected three
cases that illustrate variations of failure and success by regional
organizations tomanage nexus impacts of HPPs. (1) The Rusumo
Falls project on the Kagera River, a tributary of the Nile, is
pursued by Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania (Figure 1). The Nile
Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP), a sub-
organization of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), coordinates, and
theWorld Bank finances, the project. (2) Planned by Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda, the Ruzizi
III HPP on the Ruzizi River is being coordinated by Energie des
Grands Lacs (EGL), a regional energy organization (Figure 1).
There are plans to involve a private investor as part of a public–
private partnership (PPP) supported by several development
banks. (3) Laos is constructing the Xayaburi dam on the Mekong
with the support of Thai investors; the investment decision was
taken outside of the MRC, although Xayaburi falls under the
remit of the MRC’s mandate (Figure 2). These cases differ in the
following aspects: first, whether hydropower is planned jointly
(Ruzizi, Rusumo) or unilaterally (Xayaburi); second, whether
the process is supported by an IRBO (Rusumo, Xayaburi) or a
regional energy organization (Ruzizi); and, third, whether private
investors are present (Ruzizi, Xayaburi) or not (Rusumo). As
such, they allow for a deeper understanding of the role of IRBOs
in managing WEF nexus.
All cases build on extensive field research involving qualitative
semi-structured expert interviews [on expert interviews see
Bogner et al. (2005)]. We found qualitative semi-structured
interviews to be useful in highly politicized contexts such as
presented here as they allowed to “elicit [...] tacit knowledge
and subjective understandings and interpretations” (Marshall
and Rossman, 2006: 53). This method further allowed for a
prior elaboration of a flexible interview guideline (adaptable
for different actor groups) which facilitated good comparability
between interviews (Bryman, 2008). Interviewees were selected
following a snowball sampling technique. Snowball sampling
is a non-probability sampling technique that starts with the
identification of an initial interviewee, who then provides
further contacts. The procedure was repeated with additional
interviewees until saturation was reached [see Kirchherr and
Charles (2018) for a description and a critical review of this
method in a hydropower context]. In all cases, counterpart
institutions acted as important gatekeepers: they were connected
to all relevant stakeholders involved in the projects and facilitated
access to important interviewees.
Field work for Rusumo Falls and Ruzizi III was carried
out between December 2012 and April 2013 and included a
review of pertinent planning documents and 95 stakeholder
interviews with representatives of regional organizations, donor
representatives, members of the national negotiation teams,
representatives of the government ministries or agencies
involved, environmental and social experts, representatives of
sub-national and local administrations, as well as representatives
of the affected communities, civil society and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in all four countries. Interviewees were
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FIGURE 1 | Location of the Rusumo Falls and Ruzizi III projects, Source: Own
preparation.
selected based on their involvement in the negotiation of
both hydropower projects, their energy and environment
sector expertise or their connection to local project-affected
populations. Initial access to interviewees was provided by
NELSAP for Rusumo Falls and EGL for Ruzizi III. Information
was updated in 2016 and 2018 based on internet updates
provided by the relevant regional and donor agencies. The
interviews were transcribed, coded and analyzed using atlas.ti
content analysis software.
Field work for the Xayaburi case was carried out during a
four-week stay at the MRC in Laos in September 2011 and
includes a review of relevant planning documents, the MRC’s
planning history for all Mekong mainstream dams including
Xayaburi, and a total of 21 interviews with MRC personnel
and NGOs. The information was updated through personal
email communication with a former advisor to the MRC in
August 2014, and during interviews with NGOs in Cambodia
involved in Mekong basin planning in July 2015. In line with
the snowball method, interviewees were selected in collaboration
with international donor organizations, who provided the initial
access to the MRC Secretariat and to NGOs in Vientiane.
Interviewees were selected on the basis of their involvement in
basin-wide planning processes, their knowledge and involvement
in hydropower planning processes, the drafting of relevant
policies (including EIA and resettlement), their knowledge of
benefit-sharing processes, and their connection to local project-
affected communities.
FIGURE 2 | Location of the Xayaburi dam, Source: Own preparation.
All of our interviewees were therefore considered experts,
as they possessed specific technical, process, or interpretative
knowledge in fields related to hydropower planning processes.
Their knowledge constitutes not only specialized expertise, but
it is in large parts also practical and action-oriented knowledge
which intermingles with subjective interpretations (Bogner et al.,
2005). This in turns lends itself to a qualitative analysis as
advanced here.
The data gathered in the semi-structured interviews was
analyzed with the help of qualitative content analysis. Qualitative
content analysis is an empirical, methodologically controlled
approach of analyzing large amounts of data linked to
fixed/recorded communication (Mayring, 2000). In this case it
refers to the transcribed interviews. The method rests upon
a rule-based approach and is based on the assumption that
the content of the interview situation, e.g., the perceptions of
the interviewed experts, has to be revealed by interpretation
(Mayring, 2000).
The coding of the transcribed interviews was the essential
part of our qualitative content analysis. As we pursued a theory-
based research design for our empirical data gathering, we
were necessarily following the path of deductive category/code
development. Thus, based on our understanding of the
theoretical framework, we formulated definitions of relevant
concepts and attributed coding rules and examples which were
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summarized in a coding manual (Mayring, 2000). Although
a pure ex ante formulation of codes might be theoretically
possible, we allowed for the development of predefined categories
as well as inductive code definition based on the transcribed
interviews themselves. The interpretation of data was thus an
iterative process in which feedback loops allowed our research
to be sufficiently open and at the same time adaptable to new,
unexpected findings (Gläser and Laudel, 2009). In the Ruzizi
and Rusumo cases, transcription and coding was done digitally
and supported by f4 and atlas.ti content analysis software. In
the Xayaburi case, coding proceeded as above but was done
manually, following the recommendations by Bazeley (2007) for
small-scale studies [for a debate on manual vs. electronic coding
of qualitative interviews see Basit (2003)].
The African cases were analyzed by Ines Dombrowsky
at the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut
für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). The research design and
methodology were peer reviewed by an expert group and
presented and discussed in a two-hour public meeting at DIE to
ensure compliance with the Guidelines on Safeguarding Good
Scientific Practice and Preventing Scientific Misconduct of DIE,
and the Proposals for Safeguarding Good Scientific Practice
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft/German Research
Foundation (DFG). According to these institutional and national
guidelines and regulations, an approval by an Ethics Committee
was not required. In addition, for research in Rwanda an exposé
was presented to the Rwandan Ministry of Science upon which
the Rwandan government granted the research permit.
The case study on the Xayaburi dam was carried out by
Oliver Hensengerth, who was employed at the University of
Southampton during the time of field research. The project
underwent the standard approval procedures of the University
of Southampton following the funding decision by the British
Academy, and the project was approved as part of this process,
which is designed to ensure compliance of all research projects
with the Ethics Policy of the University of Southampton.
In all three cases, given the political sensitivity of the research
and the (partly) authoritarian political context in which the
research took place, interviewees were not asked to sign consent
forms. Instead, all subjects gave verbal informed consent to the
use of anonymized statements from the interviews for scientific
purposes.
RESULTS
The following sub-sections scrutinize transboundary nexus
governance in each case by analyzing the roles the respective
regional organizations played in terms of supporting benefit-
sharing arrangements, ensuring the application of safeguards,
and fostering the application of principles of international water
law, and how these potential roles were influenced by their
institutional designs, in particular their membership, functional
scope and the presence of a secretariat.
Rusumo Falls HPP
The Rusumo Falls HPP will be an 80 MW run-of-river plant on
the Kagera River at the border between Rwanda and Tanzania
(see Figure 1). While planning goes back to the 1980s in
the context of the then existing Kagera Basin Organization
(Rangeley et al., 1994), Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania resumed
preparation in 2006 in the context of the Nile Equatorial Lakes
Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP). NELSAP is an investment
program of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) which includes all
Nile riparian countries in the Equatorial Lakes region plus Sudan
and Egypt as downstream riparians. The NBI de facto performs
the functions of an IRBO and is recognized as such (Schmeier
et al., 2016), even if a ratified international legal agreement
is outstanding. The functional scope of NBI and NELSAP is
broad and includes water, energy, and environmental issues. The
planning of Rusumo Falls was taken forward by representatives
of the energy administrations of the three participating countries,
supported by the NELSAP Coordination Unit (CU) in Kigali as a
secretariat.
Rusumo Falls is a trilateral joint investment based on a benefit-
sharing arrangement (Dombrowsky et al., 2014). Given that the
HPP will be located at the border between Rwanda and Tanzania,
the two countries had to cooperate to build a HPP. However,
interestingly upstream Burundi participates in the project as
an equal partner. According to our interviews, Burundi was
included for at least two reasons. First, it had already been part
of the planning for Rusumo Falls in the context of the Kagera
Basin Organization (Int. 5, 8, 87). Second, as a reservoir project
the reservoir would have inundated Burundian territory (Int.
5, 7, 19, 41). The power generated is envisioned to be equally
shared among the three countries. The HPP will be publicly
owned, but privately managed. The Rusumo Power Company
Limited, co-owned by the three governments involved, was
registered in March 2013. Financial closure with the World Bank
was reached in August 2013.1 The World Bank’s International
Development Association provided USD 113.3 million as loans
or grants to each country for its equity in the Rusumo Power
Company. The compensation of project-affected populations
took place in 2015. The contract with the construction firm was
signed in November 2016 and construction started in March
2017.2 Rusumo Falls will be connected to the East African
Power Pool.
In 2002, energy experts from the Nile Equatorial Lakes
countries decided to carry out an SEA of energy options,
given that it was a requirement of the World Bank before
selecting specific projects. The SEA presented in 2005
identified Rusumo Falls HPP (as well as Ruzizi III) as
one of the five most realistic medium-term power options
(NBI, 2005). The SEA acknowledged that Rusumo Falls was
comparatively advanced in terms of technical preparation,
but identified potential social and environmental impacts as
drawbacks and recommended further assessments. Overall,
the SEA signaled a preference for hydropower options due
to the expected high cost and small size of solar energy,
1http://nelsap.nilebasin.org/attachments/article/34/Rusumo%20Factsheet_-
_ENGLISH.pdf, retrieved 19 July 2016.
2http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/new-and-events/133-construction-of-
rusumo-falls-hydroelectric-project-to-start-30-march-2017, retrieved 2 July
2018.
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or lack of identified resources for wind or geothermal
energy.
In 2006, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania signed a Joint
Project Development Agreement for Rusumo Falls. A consultant
was selected to carry out a feasibility study, including an
ESIA in 2007 and 2008 (SNC Lavalin International, 2008).
However, it turned out that for an in-depth ESIA, procedures
had to be harmonized, and a new topographical mapping, a
land use study and a household survey had to be carried
out (SNC Lavalin International, 2012). The countries requested
the consultant to do so for the so-called “full development
scheme” in order to maximize hydropower production (SNC
Lavalin International, 2012). In May 2011, the consultant
indicated that 17,450 households would be affected. The
countries therefore decided to pursue a smaller reservoir, the
“intermediate development scheme.” This still resulted in 7,330
affected households. Hence, in 2012, the countries decided
to go for a run-of-river scheme [Interview (Int.) 57]. Since
the World Bank required a change of consultant due to
corruption charges, the final results were presented in March
2013. For the run-of-river scheme, the capacity of the plant
had to be reduced from 90 to 80 MW, while the number of
affected households was reduced from 17,450 to 669 (ARTELIA,
2013). Of these, a total of 178 households and business units
had to be resettled. The project’s environmental impacts were
considered moderate. The project would mainly affect biological
diversity in the Rusumo Falls spray zone and interrupt the
river’s ecological flow on a stretch of 500 meters. Therefore,
the ESIA recommended that the spray zone be equipped
with an artificial spray system and a minimum environmental
flow of 10% (ARTELIA, 2013; Int. 56). In terms of negative
effects on the HPP, it is expected that the reservoir will be
moderately affected by sediment inflows (ARTELIA, 2013).
Hence, the ESIA recommended a sediment transport study to
be performed before start of construction and to potentially
adapt the design to minimize risk (ARTELIA, 2013). The ESIA
was carried out according to the World Bank safeguard policies
and national laws. In order to ensure that the ESIA also
fulfills the respective countries’ national laws, upon a World
Bank request, the environmental agencies of three countries
also provided clearance certificates for the HPP.3 In order to
comply with international water law principles, NELSAP sent a
riparian notification to the Nile riparian countries downstream
in November 2012 and all necessary “no objection” notifications
were received (Int. 57).
Hence, while the energy ministers had initially insisted on
maximizing energy generation, in the end the inclusive inter-state
approach and the ESIA-induced change of scheme minimized
negative impacts on the water and food security of affected
communities in the three participating countries. However, the
planning process could have been accelerated, had the countries
decided to pursue a run-of-river HPP from the beginning. As
one country representative stated: “Of course it has taken time
because we wanted this project really to be a big project, to be
3http://nelsap.nilebasin.org/attachments/article/34/Rusumo%20Factsheet_
_ENGLISH.pdf,retrieved19July2016.
implemented at full capacity, but because of the environmental
and social impact, we really had to reduce our ambitions” (Int.
95).
Ruzizi III HPP
The 147 Megawatt Ruzizi III run-of-river HPP to be located on
the Ruzizi River on the border between Rwanda and DRC (see
Figure 1), is jointly planned by Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda in
the context of Energie des Grands Lacs (EGL), a regional energy
sub-organization of the Communauté Économique des Pays des
Grands Lacs (CEPGL). EGL consists of a General Assembly of
the Ministers of Energy of the three countries, an Institutional
Meeting of Experts, a board of Account Auditors and the
Managing Committee.4 EGL holds an office (the secretariat) in
Bujumbura directed by the Managing Committee and with staff
drawn from the three countries in roughly equal proportion.
The purpose of EGL is regional energy planning.5 According to
Rangeley et al. (1994: 11): “EGL may be seen as an RBO only in
that, through its parent organization CEPGL, it is responsible,
among other things, for hydro-electric power development on
the Ruzizi river linking Lake Kivu to Lake Tanganyika. Beyond
that, it is a regional energy planning organization.” For the
negotiation of the Ruzizi III project, each country established a
negotiation team. The planning process is coordinated by the
EGL office. According to our interviews, downstream Burundi
is included, as it is an equal partner in EGL and as the
three countries already cooperated in the development and
construction of the Ruzizi II HPP under the auspices of EGL (Int.
1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 47, 87, 89, 96). It is also included as it could potentially
be affected by the project (Int. 5, 7, 19, 41).
Ruzizi III is conceived as a public–private joint venture, in
which the investor will have the majority and the countries
equal minority shares supported by donor soft loans. Each
country is supposed to have access to one third of the energy
produced, and hence, similar to Rusumo Falls, the HPP is based
on a regional benefit-sharing arrangement (Dombrowsky et al.,
2014). A pre-feasibility study was prepared in 1991 (CEPGL,
2012). In-depth planning started in 2007 after conflicts in the
region had calmed down. Project preparation is supported by
the European Investment Bank, the German KfW Development
Bank, the African Development Bank, the Agence française de
développement, the European Union and the World Bank.6
Negotiations between the then preferred investor, Sithe Global
and Industrial Power Services (IPS, Kenya), and the three
countries started in October 2012. Total costs were estimated at
USD 625 million, and the African Development Bank was first
to commit a total of USD 138 million of loans and grants for
4http://www.egl-grandslacs.org/index.php/en/about-egl/egl-bodies, retrieved 2
July 2018.
5http://www.egl-grandslacs.org/index.php/en/about-egl/mission-and-objectives,
retrieved 2 July 2018.
6http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-approves-regional-
hydropower-ppp-to-increase-electricity-supply-and-integration-in-burundi-
drc-rwanda-15255/, retrieved 20 July 2016.
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the construction of Ruzizi III in December 2015.7 Signature of
the Project Agreements between the three countries and a new
investor consortium consisting of IPS and SN Power (Norway)
had last been envisioned for May 2018. However, the signature
could not be realized as no final consensus could be reached
on three outstanding issues, including on avoiding that potential
surplus construction would be reflected in the tariff.8 Instead the
three countries signed a Declaration reinforcing their intention
to proceed with the project. Like Rusumo Falls, Ruzizi III is
supposed be connected to the East African Power Pool.
In terms of social and environmental safeguards, asmentioned
above, Ruzizi III was identified as a medium-term priority energy
investment in NELSAP’s SEA of 2005. In the SEA, this option
had the best rank in the economic, financial and environmental
categories, as no resettlement was expected (NBI, 2005). The
EGL office coordinated the preparation of the ESIA, which
was financed by the European Investment Bank. In 2012, a
pre-final ESIA was presented (SOFRECO et al., 2012). For the
ESIA, SOFRECO conducted a household survey and various
stakeholder consultation workshops. The ESIA found that 648
households would be affected, and eight to nine would have to be
resettled. Due to its potential affectedness, Burundi is supposed
to participate equally in the Local Community Development
Plan. Interviewees also argued that given that all three countries
will benefit from the electricity produced, communities in the
project areas of all three respective countries should benefit
too (Int. 34, 37, 38, 44, 54, 55, 66, 71, 78). The environmental
impacts of the HPP were considered moderate: next to the
existing Ruzizi I and II HPPs, Ruzizi III would be a further
obstacle for the Ripon barbell fish. Furthermore, Ruzizi III would
interrupt the ecological flow on a stretch of 4.3 km. Therefore,
the migration of fish shall be secured by the installation of
fish passes and a minimum ecological flow of 8% is to be
maintained (SOFRECO et al., 2012). The European Investment
Bank required the countries to carry out the ESIA according
to World Bank safeguards as well as respective national laws.
In case of divergence between national laws and World Bank
policies, the higher standard was applied (SOFRECO et al.,
2012). In March 2016 the Social and Environmental procedure
manual was validated.9 Hence, in this case, donor safeguards
also played a role, and their application was facilitated by the
regional organization EGL. However, the pre-final ESIA needs to
be validated by the private investor.
Given that EGL is a regional energy organization,
international law principles are not anchored in its statutes.
However, prior notification was also not required as all affected
riparian states are involved in project preparation.
Quite significantly, given that the functional scope of EGL
does not include land and water uses, EGL as a secretariat even
7http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-approves-ruzizi-iii-
hydropower-plant-project-bringing-green-energy-to-burundi-drc-and-rwanda-
15275/, retrieved 20 July 2016.
8http://www.egl-grandslacs.org/index.php/fr/publications/actualites/89-
declaration-de-kinshasa-sur-le-projet-ruzizi-iii, retrieved 2 July 2018.
9http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-approves-regional-
hydropower-ppp-to-increase-electricity-supply-and-integration-in-burundi-
drc-rwanda-15255/, retrieved 20 July 2016.
facilitated the set-up of an IRBO to promote the sustainable
management of the Lake Kivu and Ruzizi River Basin, the Basin
Authority of the Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi River (Autorité
du Bassin du Lac Kivu et de la Rivière de Rusizi, ABAKIR).
This was done given that the Ruzizi valley is very steep, and
human-induced and natural erosion (as well as litter) may
provide significant threats to the project (SOFRECO et al., 2012).
The International Convention on the Integrated Management
of Water Resources of the Lake Kivu and Ruzizi River Basin
(ABAKIR, 2011) was signed by the Water Ministers of the three
states in July 2011. Pending ratification through the heads of
state, an interim institutional arrangement was set up at the
premises of CEPGL in January 2013, financed by the European
Development Fund (Int. 17, 62). ABAKIR is supposed to provide
a basis for a better use of shared waters in the basin and therefore
mitigate the risk of lower energy output due to detrimental
upstream water usage. In addition to ABAKIR, a coordination
center will be put in place by the three countries to coordinate the
use of the Ruzizi River across the Ruzizi I, Ruzizi II and Ruzizi III
HPPs (Int. 2). Furthermore, the ESIA proposed to set up a 5 years
anti-erosion program in the order of USD 1.7million (SOFRECO
et al., 2012). In this context, the consultants also suggest that the
project developer considers setting up a PES scheme in the Ruzizi
Valley.
Xayaburi HPP
The Xayaburi HPP is a 1285 Megawatt HPP built by Laos
on the mainstream of the Mekong, financed by private Thai
banks and constructed by the Thai construction company Ch.
Karnchang. Laos plans to export 95% of the electricity produced
to Thailand (Middleton and Dore, 2015). Laos along with
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam is a member of the MRC.
Upstream China and Myanmar are not members and have
observer status. China has been collaborating with the MRC
during dry season flow, but has refused to share further data.
The MRC has a wide-ranging functional scope. Article 1 of
the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable
Development of the Mekong River Basin (henceforth: 1995
Agreement) commits members to “cooperate in all fields
of sustainable development, utilization, management and
conservation” including hydropower, fisheries, navigation,
and flood control. The principal tool for this is the Basin
Development Plan (MRC, 2016a) which develops a joint
planning approach, including an equitable distribution of risks
and benefits between all member states. This joint planning
function is carried out by the MRC’s Secretariat on behalf of
member states, who are represented in the Council (heads of
government) and the Joint Committee (sector ministries) and
who determine the Secretariat’s work plan (1995 Agreement,
Chapter IV). The Basin Development Plan is mutually agreed by
member states. To implement it, the MRC has set out a number
of guidelines and procedures. With relevance to mainstream
hydropower dams, this includes a 5-volume Knowledge Base
on Benefit Sharing (MRC, 2011), the Procedures for Prior
Notification, Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) (1995
Agreement, Article 5; (MRC, 2016b), and the Preliminary
Design Guidance for Proposed Mainstream Dams in the Lower
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Mekong Basin (MRC, 2009). The MRC also applies principles of
international water law, notably the principles of reasonable and
equitable utilization, and no harm (1995 Mekong Agreements,
Articles 5 and 7) and has operationalized the principle of
prior notification in the PNPCA. The focus on hydropower is
important as Laos and Cambodia are planning a total of eleven
dams on theMekongmainstream, of which nine are to be located
in Laos and two in Cambodia. This is in addition to the upstream
dams built or planned by China. The first of the eleven dams in
the Lower Mekong is the Xayaburi dam.
Although as a mainstream dam Xayaburi is subject to MRC
procedures and guidelines, Laos initiated the project unilaterally.
In 2007, Laos concluded a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) with Ch. Karnchang to study the feasibility of the project;
in 2008 the two parties signed a Project Development Agreement.
In 2010 Thai engineering consulting company TEAM completed
the feasibility study and the ESIA. However, the ESIA assessed
impacts only ten kilometers downstream from the dam site.
Hence, transboundary effects with respect to sediment transport
and fisheries, and implications for food security downstream
were not studied.
Still in 2010, Laos and the Electricity Generating Authority of
Thailand (EGAT) signed aMoU for a Power Purchase Agreement
despite ambiguity over the status of the dam (Matthews,
2012); and Laos and Ch. Karnchang signed the Engineering,
Procurement and Construction contract (Hensengerth, 2015).
Following the completion of these processes, Laos submitted
the project documents to the MRC, which started the MRC’s
first ever PNCPA process. In these processes, the politics of the
Thai electricity sector played an important role. In particular, the
monopoly position and profit structure of the Thai state-owned
electricity utility EGAT, private sector profit interests, and civil
society opposition against domestic HPPs are strong drivers for
the Thai government and private actors to support hydropower
development in Laos, with an eye to importing the produced
energy (Matthews, 2012).
The PNPCA process lasted for six months, fromOctober 2010
to April 2011 and was held at Joint Committee level. It ended
without agreement, with downstream Vietnam and Cambodia
citing a threat to their food security, a claim that Laos rejected.
The issue was moved up to Council level, but still members
were unable to find a compromise. During the Council meeting
in December 2011, Council members decided to commission
a study to further explore potential transboundary impacts of
mainstream hydropower dams (the so-called Council Study).
Meanwhile, Cambodia and Vietnam found support for their
concerns in a transboundary SEA study for all planned Mekong
mainstream dams, commissioned by the MRC in 2009, funded
by MRC donors, and conducted by Australian environmental
consulting firm ICEM. The SEA suggested a severe lack of data
on transboundary impacts and therefore a moratorium on dam-
building for ten years to allow the generation of reliable data
(ICEM, 2010). In contrast to the TEAM ESIA study, the SEA
considered cumulative impacts of the eleven mainstream dams
(Suhardiman et al., 2015). Again, Laos rejected that Xayaburi
would produce any downstream impacts. Yet, facing a public
backlash from downstream countries, international donors as
well as regional and international NGOs and media outlets, Laos
commissioned Swiss-Finnish consultancy Pöyry to conduct a
study on whether Laos complied with the 1995 Agreement, the
PNPCA, and the Preliminary Design Guidance for Proposed
Mainstream Dams in the Lower Mekong Basin. This so-called
Compliance Study, published in 2011, found Laos in compliance
but suggested alterations to the dam design to allow fish passage
and sediment flush (Pöyry, 2011). While Laos subsequently
altered the dam design accordingly, it did not alleviate concerns
by Vietnam, Cambodia andNGOswho insisted on implementing
the moratorium proposed by the SEA. Citing its compliance
with MRC guidelines and procedures, and insulated from
international pressure by private Thai finance, Laos continued
planning for the dam and held the ground breaking ceremony
in November 2012.
The Council Study was published in 2017. It concludes that
if mainstream dams are not realized, the Lower Mekong Basin
would lose almost 60% of economic benefits in the power
generation sector. At the same time, however, “nearly 25% of the
hydropower gains would be lost in the fisheries sectors” (MRC,
2017b: 6, 52). In the absence of benefit-sharing mechanisms
and coordination with China and Myanmar, positive and
negative impacts will be unevenly distributed between upstream
and downstream countries, but also between poor and richer
population groups, with significant impacts on food security to
be felt particularly in Laos and Cambodia (MRC, 2017a: 2–4,
6–7). The Council Study therefore confirmed previous studies
suggesting a strong impact on food security due to the impact on
fisheries (Smajgl et al., 2015; Pittock et al., 2016). Yet, regardless
of the 2011 Council decision to conduct a multi-year study, Laos
continued with dam-planning: in 2014 it notified the MRC of its
decision to start construction of the Don Sahong dam. Indeed,
Fawthrop10 argued that “[w]ork ismoving forward faster than the
completion of scientific studies needed to provide the evidence
of ‘significant harm.’ ” And in November 2016, Laos notified the
MRC of its intention to start construction of the Pak Beng HPP.11
DISCUSSION
This paper asked how regional organizations may influence
nexus governance related to hydropower projects on
international rivers. We posited that countries investing in
hydropower can be expected to coordinate regarding the HPP’s
energy, food and water security impacts if coordination is in their
perceived self-interest. Regional organizations may furthermore
foster transboundary nexus governance by supporting benefit-
sharing arrangements, ensuring the application of safeguards,
and fostering the application of principles of international water
law. We assumed that these potential roles were influenced by
the organization’s institutional designs, including an inclusive
membership structure, a sufficiently broad functional scope
10https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/mekong-summit-struggles-to-halt-
devastating-dams/, retrieved 5 July 2018.
11Further details on the Don Sahong and Pak Beng PNPCA can be found
on the MRC’s PNPCA pages at http://www.mrcmekong.org/topics/pnpca-prior-
consultation/, retrieved 5 July 2018.
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und the presence of a secretariat. Overall, the cases show that
there can be fundamental differences in the way cross-border,
cross-sector coordination related to hydropower investments
does or does not take place and the role regional organizations
do or do not play in this.
With respect to the investing state’s self-interest to coordinate
across countries and sectors, fundamental differences exist
between the African and the Mekong cases. The two African
HPPs are investments on border rivers, and hence required
coordination at least among the two border states. Still, quite
significantly in both cases, Burundi as potentially affected third
country was included as an equal partner which fully participates
in the benefit-sharing scheme. In the Rusumo Falls case, WEF
nexus governance furthermore took place in so far as the dam
design was changed from a reservoir to a run-of-river project.
In the Ruzizi III case, the set up of ABAKIR as IRBO can
be considered as an additional element of nexus governance.
In contrast, Xayaburi is a quasi-unilateral investment by Laos
(albeit with Thai support) on a transboundary river. In this
case Laos (and Thailand) decided to go ahead with the project
despite potential negative effects on downstream Cambodia and
Vietnam, even if in the end some modifications in dam design,
and hence arguably some limited nexus governance, took place.
However, the unilateral investment happened even despite Lao
and Thai membership in theMRC and elaborateMRC provisions
on joint planning and benefit sharing related to mainstream
Mekong dams. Hence, in line with literature on benefit sharing,
the cases show that nexus governance may be easier in the case
of joint rather than unilateral investments. Furthermore, in the
two African cases, arguably not least due to donor requirements,
more attention was given to social and environmental impacts
that in some earlier joint dam projects studied by Hensengerth
et al. (2012).
In terms of the HPP itself being negatively impacted by
upstream countries’ land and water uses, the Ruzizi case is
illustrative. The set-up of an IRBO for Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi
River (ABAKIR) and the proposed PES schemes demonstrate
that it can be in the self-interest of those who plan HPPs to
coordinate with—and even to set up—an IRBO in order to
reduce negative effects of upstream water and land uses on
the HPP.
With respect to the role of the regional organizations
in supporting benefit-sharing arrangements, in the African
joint investments NELSAP and EGL provide the platforms
for joint project preparation and the respective secretariats
are supporting the planning process in several ways, even if
both processes are taking much more time than originally
envisioned and even if it is still uncertain whether a final
agreement will be reached for Ruzizi III. In contrast, while
the MRC Secretariat sought to influence the decision-making
process related to the Xayaburi dam, it was in a fundamentally
different position, having no implementation mechanism to
force countries to provide mutually beneficial solutions. Hence,
Xayaburi points to the limits of IRBOs to coordinate HPP
investments, if member states are unwilling to pursue respective
investments in the framework of the regional organization. It
also shows that the scale at which HPP investment decisions
are taken may not correspond to the basin level (Matthews,
2012; Hensengerth, 2015), which may limit the influence of
IRBOs.
In terms of the role of the regional organizations in
ensuring the application of safeguards, in all three cases regional
organizations initiated SEAs with the support of donors. The
two African HPPs were identified in an SEA of power options
coordinated by an IRBO (NELSAP). However, the preparation
of this SEA was driven by World Bank policies, so it is
unclear whether this would have taken place in the absence of
donors. In the Xayaburi case, the MRC Secretariat initiated a
donor-supported SEA after Laos had signed a MoU with Ch.
Karnchang.While the SEA recommended a ten-yearmoratorium
on construction, and further studies, Laos did not take up
this recommendation, illustrating the limits of the MRC and
of the SEA as a procedural instrument vis-à-vis private-sector-
supported investments. Suhardiman et al. (2015: 199) point out
that theMRC Secretariat still used the SEA “as a way of providing
political space and opening the discussions on dams to a wider
public” and of informing the PNPCA process. Hence, the MRC
Secretariat used the SEA to influence the discourse and Laos’s
dam design to a certain extent in a situation where the limits of
its agenda-setting power became obvious.
With respect to the role of regional organizations in the
preparation of ESIAs, the juxtaposition of the two African and
the Mekong cases also illustrate stark differences, depending on
whether the investments are undertaken jointly or unilaterally.
The African joint investments coordinated through regional
organizations made an ESIA covering all states involved obvious.
However, similar to the SEA, in both cases the ESIAs needed to
satisfy World Bank requirements. In contrast, in the Xayaburi
case, Laos did not prepare a transboundary ESIA and resisted
doing so even after repeated requests from Vietnam, Cambodia,
the MRC Secretariat and donors. Hence, regional organizations
are more likely to be in a position to coordinate ESIAs in the case
of joint rather than unilateral investments.
In terms of the role of regional organizations supporting
the application of international water law in general and prior
notification in particular, the cases show that the two IRBOs,
NELSAP and MRC, promoted notification procedures, albeit
with differing success. In the Rusumo case, the downstream
countries beyond Lake Victoria provided no objections without
further complications. It is worthwhile noting that impacts can
be expected to be minimal since HPP-induced flow variations
of the Kagera River would be buffered by Lake Victoria.
Furthermore, as a run-of-river project, no consumptive uses and
low evaporation losses are expected. Still, Egypt’s no objection
reflected a shift of attitude, as Egypt used to observe Rwandan
water uses carefully before the NBI was established (Int. 57). In
the Xayaburi case, the application of prior notification through
the PNPCA process did not lead to constructive consultations.
While downstream countries, donors and NGOs used the
MRC as a focal point for their protest (Hensengerth, 2015),
the PNPCA process certainly remains unsatisfactory. The case
also shows that the international legal principles of reasonable
and equitable utilization and avoidance of significant harm
were understood differently by member states, leading to a
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rejection or to different interpretations of underlying data.
Donors subsequently proposed a review of the implementation
of the PNPCA provisions (Hensengerth, 2015). In contrast to
the IRBOs, EGL as regional energy organization did not apply
notification procedures. However, they were unnecessary in this
case as all potentially affected riparian countries were part of the
investment, suggesting that membership matters in this regard.
Hence, while an advantage of IRBOs may be the application
of principles of international water law, the Xayaburi case
also shows that this may shift the conflict to one around the
interpretation of the respective principles.
Therefore, while regional organization may support benefit-
sharing arrangements and the application of environmental and
social safeguards and international law principles, their influence
also depends on the willingness of the member states and
investors to abide by the organization’s rules. This, however,
is not only the case for nexus governance but a general
challenge in international relations and therefore also for regional
organizations.
We furthermore assumed that the design of regional
organizations, including a broad functional scope, an inclusive
membership and the existence of a coordinating secretariat
matter in promoting nexus governance. With respect to
membership, the inclusive institutional arrangements in the
cases of Rusumo Falls and Ruzizi III ensured that potential
negative impacts on third countries (in both cases Burundi)
were considered and that Burundi would even equally benefit
from the respective HPPs. In the Mekong case, the fact that
China and Myanmar only have observer status in the MRC
limits MRC members’ coordination with upstream water users.
However, it should also be noted that Laos and Thailand went
ahead with Xayaburi despite their respective membership in the
MRC. This implies that while joint membership may promote
coordination, it cannot be considered a sufficient condition for
nexus governance.
In terms of functional scope, in the case of NELSAP,
coordination of energy, water and land issues is within the
mandate of NELSAP. Still, this did not prevent the energy
experts for a long time from pursuing a reservoir project
in order to maximize hydropower generation, although they
finally changed the scheme once the resettlement figures were
provided. In the case of Ruzizi III, EGL’s functional scope
was considered too narrow to deal with land and water uses
upstream. Therefore, given the significant threats to the HPP
by erosion, EGL even supported the set-up of ABAKIR as
IRBO for Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi Basin, which however, still
has to demonstrate its effectiveness. In that sense, a narrow
functional scope did not prevent nexus governance. In the
Mekong case, the MRC has an encompassing coordinating
role for the sustainable development of the Mekong basin.
The MRC has formulated rules for basin development, to
which member states are bound. The MRC would therefore
be ideally placed to consider WEF nexus and has even
initiated WEF nexus dialogues (Middleton et al., 2015; Lebel
and Lebel, 2018). However, as discussed above, the MRC
could not prevent Laos from generating financial resources
outside of the MRC and the organization’s donor framework
to become financially independent of any multilateral financing
arrangements and from any pressure emerging from such
arrangements—in sharp contrast to the African case studies.
Hence, our assumption that it may be easier to involve various
sectors if the organization has a sufficiently broad mandate and
functional scope to do so, is not directly supported by the cases
studied.
In the Rusumo Falls and Ruzizi cases, the respective
secretariats played an important role in coordinating the
planning and the negotiation processes. In the case of Rusumo
Falls, the ESIA coordinated by NELSAP eventually led to the
change of theHPP design. In the case of Ruzizi III, EGL facilitated
the set up of ABAKIR as IRBO. In contrast, while in the Xayaburi
case the MRC Secretariat became a focal point of the protests
of downstream countries, donors and NGOs, it was not in a
position to enforce its comprehensive planning procedures for
mainstream dams, showing that the influence of the secretariat
to set the agenda may be limited and hinges upon the willingness
and compliance by its member states.
Beyond our analytical framework, the analysis shows that
the effectiveness of regional organizations in fostering nexus
governance is also influenced by the availability of data as well
as the presence of donors and private investors. All cases show
that the assessment of impacts and nexus governance is data
intensive and that the lack of good data or a refusal to generate
the respective datamay be a hindering factor. In theMekong case,
gaining a joint understanding of impacts turned out to be difficult
and Laos did not accept the ten-year moratorium suggested in
the SEA to improve the scientific basis for dam planning. In the
Rusumo Falls case, it took three additional years of study until
an ESIA that satisfied donor demands was presented. The fact
that the scientific basis for environmental impact assessments in
Africa’s Great Lakes region was limited was also supported by the
interviews. While one group of interview respondents reiterated
findings from the ESIAs that the environmental impacts of
Ruzizi III and Rusumo Falls HPPs would be limited (e.g.,
Int. 1, 24, 56), one independent local environmental expert
believed that the scope and quality of the environmental impact
assessments for Rusumo Falls and Ruzizi III were inadequate
(Int. 23). Doubt in the quality of the ESIA was also supported
by negative experiences with other development projects (Int.
23, 64). Furthermore, several interlocutors stated that they were
insufficiently informed about environmental impacts and lacked
knowledge (e.g., Int. 68).
The cases also illustrate that besides regional organizations,
the presence or absence of other actors, including donors and the
private sector, plays a crucial role—and maybe a more important
role than the regional organizations themselves. The Xayaburi
case illustrates that access to private sector capital may change
the power position by and enable unilateral action of countries
which, due to lack of access to financial and technical resources,
were previously in a weak negotiating position (Hensengerth,
2015). But also the Thai utility EGAT and the Thai government
played important roles in moving forward with the Xayaburi
dam by concluding the power purchase agreement and by
allowing Thai private banks to provide the loans despite the
ambiguities in the PNPCA process. In the Ruzizi case, due to
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the relative economic weakness of the countries, donors are
still involved next to the private investor. In this case it is still
open whether a final deal will be reached, also given that the
private investor is in a strong negotiation position vis-à-vis the
countries involved. If the public-private joint venture comes
about, the application of environmental and social safeguards
will also depend on their uptake by the private investor. In
contrast, Rusumo Falls is entirely donor funded. According to
one interviewee, the World Bank wanted Rusumo Falls to be a
“pilot” for sustainable hydropower after its reengagement with
the sector (Int. 3). Still, even the World Bank could not prevent
the countries from pursuing the reservoir project in the first
place.
Last but not least, the Ruzizi case shows that besides
IRBOs, as usually argued in the literature, also regional energy
organizations may play a role in nexus governance [see also
Scheumann and Tigrek (2015) for the Coruh River shared
by Georgia and Turkey]. While this paper has provided first
insights into potential strengths and weaknesses of both types
of organizations in nexus governance, this could still be studied
more systematically.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper sought to contribute to the evolving literature
on governing the WEF nexus by analyzing the case of
hydropower investments on shared rivers and the role that
regional organizations may play in governing nexus impacts.
In line with Weitz et al. (2017), the article showed that under
certain conditions self-interested actors might derive benefits
from coordination and from governing WEF nexus impacts
and that this might be promoted by coordinating agencies
and procedural instruments, such as SEAs and ESIAs. This
pertains in particular to the African cases studied, where
hydropower investments on border rivers required coordination
among the border states, where the existence of regional
organizations facilitated the inclusion of Burundi as a further
affected country, and where donors requested the application of
World Bank environmental and social safeguards. In these cases,
regional organizations supported benefit-sharing arrangements,
the application of safeguards and, where applicable, international
law principles, even if it is still open whether a final agreement
on Ruzizi III can be reached. In contrast, the Xayaburi case
illustrates that the picture may be different in the case of
hydropower investments on transboundary rivers, if the investing
state believes that it is in its self-interest to proceed with
the respective hydropower investment outside the frame of
regional organizations. In fact, as the Xayaburi case illustrates,
new private investors from middle income countries may
fundamentally change the power dynamics on international
rivers despite the existence of an IRBO, and the latter’s influence
on investment projects by member states may be very limited:
while Laos eventually adjusted the design of the Xayaburi dam
to some extent, a moratorium on dam construction could not
be imposed. This also points to the limits of regime theory
in explaining power dynamics in international basins (e.g.,
Furlong, 2006; Zeitoun, 2007), and supports Weitz et al.’s
contention that nexus governance may be limited by power
dynamics. Beyond the factors highlighted by Weitz et al. (2017),
the article also found that the assessment of impacts and
nexus governance may be complicated by poor or disputed
data.
The question is what recommendations can be drawn from
the analysis. While regional organizations may play a role in
WEF nexus governance, the Xayaburi case also points to their
limits. At the same time, had the MRC not been in place, it is
questionable whether adjustments would have been made to the
design of the Xayaburi dam at all. Therefore, particularly in view
of the increase in private sector investments in hydropower on
international rivers, consideration should nevertheless be given
to further setting up and strengthening regional organizations
in order to support nexus governance (Dombrowsky and
Scheumann, 2016). At the same time, the cases also show that
environmental and social safeguards are important irrespective
of the existence of regional organizations, even if the latter may
support their application. Hence, also private sector initiatives,
such as the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol
of the International Hydropower Association, may be worth
supporting to ensure nexus governance (IHA, 2010). This
said, the cases also illustrate that the basin scale is rarely
the scale of decision-making for energy investments, which
points to the limits of influence of IRBOs. Hence, while
nexus impact of hydropower investments should be studied at
the basin scale, it would be inadequate to limit the analysis
of nexus governance related to hydropower to the basin
scale.
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